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Throwing the Testimony Out with the Bathwater:
Washington’s Application of Crawford Hearsay in
Child Abuse Cases
Laura Harmon*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lisa Burgess and her one-year-old daughter began living with Steven
Beadle in October of 2004.1 Almost two years later, the girl told her mother
about discomfort in her genital area and began frequently drawing pictures
of male genitalia.2 Her mother immediately confronted Beadle, causing the
girl to cry.3 Beadle screamed at the girl, “[D]o you love daddy[?]” and
“[D]addy’s going away to prison for life if you say something like this to
anybody.”4
Shortly afterwards, Beadle was sent to prison for a crime unrelated to the
molestation accusation.5 A few months later, the girl started drawing male
genitalia again, calling them “tails.”6 When Lisa asked about the drawings,
the girl would crumple up the paper and throw it away.7 The girl told her

*

JD Candidate 2014, Seattle University School of Law; BA Occidental College, 2011. I
would like to thank everyone on the Seattle Journal for Social Justice for all of their help
on this article and my family and friends for their support. Any mistakes are my own.
1
Petition for Review at 3, State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863 (Wash. 2011) (No. 37508-7-II),
available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A08/842043%20prv.pdf.
2
State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863, 866 (Wash. 2011).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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mom’s husband that the drawings were of Beadle’s “tail,” and when she
touched it, the tail made her hands sticky.8
Alarmed by what the girl said, the girl’s mother contacted the police.9 A
detective and a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker interviewed the
girl.10 It began with a conversational tone, but once the questions turned
towards Beadle, the girl shut down and became anxious and worried about
getting in trouble.11 Subsequently, the girl displayed the same emotional
discomfort and distress when speaking to a therapist and a mental health
clinician.12 Eventually she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder and a psychiatric condition the court called “sexual abuse of a
child.”13
As the case proceeded to trial, the now four-year-old girl was required to
come into court for a pre-trial hearing.14 On the first day of the hearing, the
girl crumpled to the floor outside the courtroom and lay there crying,
refusing to talk for about an hour.15 Even after the social worker got the girl
to calm down, she still refused to enter the courtroom.16 This behavior
continued for several days, with the girl screaming and crying in the
hallway so loud it could be heard in the courtroom.17 The girl never testified
at the pre-trial hearing, let alone at trial.18 However, her out-of-court
statements to the detective and the CPS worker were admitted into

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 867.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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evidence.19 At the conclusion of the criminal trial, Beadle was convicted of
two counts of first-degree child molestation and given an exceptional
sentence—a sentence above the standard range given the defendant’s
criminal history and the nature of the crime.20
The Beadle case exemplifies a traumatic situation for a child victim.
Despite the good intentions of the parents, the State, the defense, and the
judiciary, the girl endured a substantial amount of trauma just trying to face
Beadle in court. Why did the little girl have to endure this emotional
turmoil?
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution gives a
defendant the opportunity to face his or her accuser.21 However, the courts
have carved out exceptions to this rule to accommodate for extraordinary
situations like in Beadle. In Crawford v. Washington, decided seven years
before Beadle, the United States Supreme Court changed the way it
evaluated Confrontation Clause cases,22 stating courts must analyze whether
the out-of-court statements that are sought to be admitted against the
defendant are of a testimonial nature.23 The Crawford court determined that
if a statement is testimonial, it would be excluded; yet the court declined to
define the term “testimonial.”24 The Crawford holding drew an ambiguous
and seemingly malleable line as to when statements are admissible, causing
much confusion and uncertainty in trial and appellate courts.25
Like many states, Washington has grappled with the application of
Crawford and its progeny. Currently, the Washington Supreme Court

19

Id. at 867–68.
Id. at 868.
21
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Daniel J. Capra, Amending the Hearsay Exception for Declarations Against Penal
Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2409, 2419 (Dec. 2005).
20
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applies a four-factor test to determine whether out-of-court statements are
testimonial in nature: (1) whether the speaker is describing events
contemporaneously or instead describing past events; (2) whether a
reasonable listener would recognize that the speaker is facing an ongoing
emergency; (3) whether the statements were necessary to resolve a present
emergency, or instead to learn what had happened in the past; and (4) the
degree to which the “interrogation” is formal.26 Courts must apply these
factors uniformly both in terms of structure and substance. At the same
time, stare decisis requires Confrontation Clause analysis to remain faithful
to the original Crawford decision and its progeny.
Washington courts should amend this four-factor test to consider the
totality of the circumstances when evaluating whether to admit a child
victim’s out-of-court statement. As part of this totality of the circumstances
evaluation, this Note offers several additional factors for Washington courts
to consider, such as the status and role of the listener, the listener’s
relationship to the child, the behavior of the child during the interaction, the
substance of the statement, and the environment in which the statement was
made.
Part II describes the nature of child sexual abuse cases and how such
cases are typically prosecuted, which can necessitate special consideration
when Crawford is applied. Part III outlines the background of United States
Supreme Court Confrontation Clause analysis, from the reliability test of
Ohio v. Roberts through the primary purpose test of Michigan v. Bryant.27
Part IV outlines the relevant framework Washington has chosen in applying
Crawford. Part V analyzes how Washington appellate courts have applied
the “testimonial” test of Crawford. Part VI discusses the social justice

26

State v. Pugh, 225 P.3d 892, 896 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) (citing Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006)).
27
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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issues created by Washington’s current regime. And lastly, part VII
proposes changes in Washington’s application of Crawford to take into
account the unique cases of child sexual abuse.

II. NATURE AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
Sexual abuse of children is a silent epidemic in the United States. The
Department of Child Services recorded more than 63,000 instances of child
sexual abuse in 2010 alone.28 However, this figure represents only reported
cases,29 and experts estimate that only 10 percent of sexually abused
children report to law enforcement and other government agencies.30 Child
victims can be extremely hesitant to report for a number of reasons. First,
many cases involve abusers who the children know and trust, such as
neighbors, family members, and friends of their parents.31 Second, children
are hesitant because they have feelings of embarrassment or shame about
the abuse.32 Third, studies have shown that children usually do not
experience symptoms of child abuse until later in life.33 Other contributing
factors include the trauma created by the abuser’s grooming process and a
child’s inability to describe or recognize that the abuse is wrong.34
Therefore, if children choose to tell someone, it may be months or even
years after the abuse occurred.35 The prosecution of these cases frequently

28

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 50 (2010),
available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm10/cm10.pdf.
29
Id.
30
Matt Ledesma, Child Sex Abuse Often Unreported: Fewer than 10% of Victims Tell
Others of Incident, TIMES RECORD NEWS (Nov. 11, 2011 1:00AM),
http://www.timesrecordnews.com/news/2011/nov/11/child-sex-abuse-often-unreported/.
31
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Child Sexual Abuse, available at http://www.ptsd.
va.gov/public/types/violence/child-sexual-abuse.asp.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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hangs on the sole testimony of the victim. Of the children who do testify, it
can be a difficult process for those who are the most emotionally fragile
because of the presence of his or her abuser in court.
Common law previously set high age thresholds for child witnesses,
usually excluding those under the age of 12 from testifying.36 When the
Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975, however, they “firmly
rejected arbitrary age barriers, and instead presumed all witnesses were
competent.”37 By the early 1980s, child physical and sexual abuse cases
became more prominent in the judicial system due to changes in reporting
requirements mandated by the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA).38 Child testimony was, and is, critical in these cases.39
There are two major, and often conflicting, societal interests in
prosecuting child sexual abuse cases.40 The first is to limit the amount of
trauma the child victim suffers during the process of prosecution;41 the
second is to maximize the amount of lawfully available evidence.42 Studies
have estimated that children comprise approximately 71 percent of all
reported sex crime victims.43 A 2008 study found that one in five girls ages

36

Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The History of Children’s Hearsay: From
Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. 1029, 1032–34 (2007) (noting several
presumptions against child competency for certain ages).
37
Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual Abuse: Why
Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16 WIDENER L. REV.
239, 240 (2010) (suggesting that this became the model for later state evidence rules, but
did not eliminate pervasive hostility to presuming young children to be competent).
38
Id. at 240–41.
39
Id. at 240.
40
See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 547 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. 1989) (analyzing
“conflicting considerations regarding hearsay admissibility in child sexual abuse cases”).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, Characteristics of Crimes Against Juveniles,
JUV. JUST. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice/Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency
Prevention, Rockville, Md.), June 2000, at 1, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/179034.pdf.
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14 to 17 had been victims of sexual assault or attempted sexual assault, that
six percent of all surveyed children were victims in the last year, and that
nearly ten percent of all the children surveyed had been victims at some
point.44 A 2006 Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) study
identified almost 80,000 child victims of sexual abuse during child services
investigations.45 Even these estimates are grossly understated in light of the
large number of unreported cases.46
A. Prosecution Difficulty of Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Child sexual abuse cases are difficult to prosecute for several reasons,
including that they often lack physical evidence, there are often no third
party eyewitnesses to the crime, and, in extreme circumstances, the child
victims may be unavailable to testify.47 Determination of whether to allow
or prohibit victim testimony in child sexual abuse cases requires a balancing
of the government, defense, and victim interests.48 The difficulty in
obtaining evidence, some of which is of questionable reliability, must be
balanced against the accused’s rights. Additionally, jurors and judges often

44
David Finkelhor et al., Children’s Exposure to Violence: A Comprehensive National
Survey, JUV. JUST. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice/ Office of Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency Prevention, Rockville, Md.), Oct. 2009. at 1-2, 5 available at http://www.nc
jrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227744.pdf.
45
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2006, 26–27
(2008), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm06/cm06.pdf.
46
Tiffany Sharples, Study: Most Child Abuse Goes Unreported, TIME (Dec. 2, 2008),
available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1863650,00.html.
47
See Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact
on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 374–76 (2005)
(identifying difficulties of prosecuting child sexual abuse cases based on the nature of the
crime).
48
Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The Need
for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
at 214–18 (1995) (discussing conflicting issues of need for hearsay in sexual abuse cases
and the possible infringements to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation).
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express concern regarding “suggestibility, manipulation, coaching, or
confusing fact with fantasy,”49 leading them to view child testimony with a
more skeptical eye than adult testimony.50
These stereotypes are largely a result of a series of preschool sexual
abuse scandals during the mid-1980s to the 1990s.51 In the McMartin
Preschool scandal, one in this series, caretakers of a preschool day care
facility were charged with multiple counts of child sexual abuse.52 After six
years of prosecution, there were no convictions.53 As a result, popular
public opinion reasoned the accusers’ claims must be fictitious, creating a
general skepticism about these types of cases.54 Also helping create this
general perception, the suggestive interview techniques, such as positive
social reinforcement (i.e. praise, approval) and negative feedback (i.e.
disapproval),55 used in those cases resulted in several “high profile

49
“Unfortunately, there are countless ways that can potentially compromise testimony of
young children including: the use of yes [or] no questions, forced choice questions,
repetitious questioning, misleading questions, repeated interviewing plausible
suggestions, guided imagery, stereotyping, interpreting play with anatomical dolls, peer
and parental pressure, and selective reinforcement.” Raeder, supra note 38, at 240 (citing
to Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, Jeopardy in the
Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis of Children’s Testimony (1995); Nancy E. Walker,
Forensic Interviews of Children: The Components of Scientific Validity and Legal
Admissibility, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (Winter 2002) at 149, 160–65).
50
Raeder, supra note 37, at 375.
51
See, e.g., Anna Richey-Allen, Note, Presuming Innocence: Expanding the
Confrontation Clause Analysis to Protect Children and Defendants in Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1090, 1104–07 (2009). These scandals involved
investigations that quickly devolved to “witch hunts.” Id.
52
Robert Reinhold, The Longest Trial – A Post-Mortem; Collapse of Child-Abuse Case:
So Much Agony for So Little, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1990, available at http://www.ny
times.com/1990/01/24/us/longest-trial-post-mortem-collapse-child-abuse-case-so-muchagony-for-so-little.html.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
F. James Billings et al., Can Reinforcement Induce Children to Falsely Incriminate
Themselves?, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 126 (2007).
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acquittals, as well as questionable convictions.”56 This distrust of child
testimony still exists in the minds of jurors, attorneys, and judges.57
Additionally, when child victims do take the stand, their behavior can be
negatively perceived by jurors. Child victims often disclose in stages, the
child disclosing different parts of an assault over time and possibly out of
chronological order, which amplifies the risk of perceived inconsistency
and heightened scrutiny.58 In fact, defense counsel frequently attacks partial
disclosures as inconsistencies in the victim’s story.59 Similar to domestic
violence cases,60 another problematic aspect of child victim testimony is a
high probability of recantation.61

56

Raeder, supra note 37, at 242. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the
United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 539-40 (2005)
(discussing the child care sexual abuse cases).
57
See generally Livia L. Gilstrap et al., Child Witnesses: Common Ground and
Controversies in the Scientific Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 59 (2005);
Michael R. Keenan, Child Witnesses: Implication of Contemporary Suggestibility
Research in a Changing Legal Landscape, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 99 (2006);
Stephen J. Ceci et al., Unwarranted Assumptions about Children’s Testimonial Accuracy,
3 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 311 (2007).
58
Raeder, supra note 37, at 375.
59
See Thomas D. Lyon, FALSE DENIALS: OVERCOMING METHODOLOGICAL BIASES IN
ABUSE DISCLOSURE RESEARCH, IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: DISCLOSURE, DELAY AND
DENIAL 41, 53–54 (Margart-Ellen Pipe et al. eds. 2007); Olafson & Lederson, infra note
62 at 27, 30.
60
Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 768 (2005)
(“[v]ictims of domestic violence are more prone than other crime victims to recant or
refuse to cooperate after initially providing information to the police. Recent evidence
suggests that 80 to 85 percent of battered women will recant at some point.”). See also
Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions
to Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence,
11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2002) (describing non-cooperation by recantation and
failure to appear as “an epidemic in domestic violence cases”); Lisa Marie De Sanctis,
Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence & Justice for Victims of Domestic
Violence, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM, 359, 367–68 (1996) (“[V]ictims of domestic
violence are uncooperative in approximately eighty to ninety percent of cases.[T]he
victim will usually recant her prior statements.”). Most of the estimates regarding
recanting appear anecdotal, since there is no known study measuring victim recanting.
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However, there have been no studies to show that all children are
particularly unreliable witnesses; in fact, children generally understand what
it means to tell the truth, and do so.62 Studies alleging suggestibility,
especially during the 1980s and 1990s, usually employed methodological
biases, whereas recent studies have eliminated these biases and generally
found that children are not hyper-suggestible.63
Additionally, studies have compared the disclosures of childhood sexual
abuse made by adults and children, and found many similar behaviors and
rates of recantation.64A 2007 study of approximately 250 substantiated
cases of sexual abuse found that nearly one in four children recanted at
some point.65 In comparison, some studies have found that up to 71 percent
of adult rape victims recant.66 When parental figures were the abusers, as is
commonly the case in child sexual abuse cases,67 children were more likely
to recant.68 However, the study found no evidence linking recantation to
false complaints.69 Therefore, even in cases where victims did recant, the
Certainly, some domestic violence victims are eager to assist in the prosecution of their
batterers. See id. There is, however, a consensus in the literature that recanting is a
significant problem in domestic violence cases. See id.
61
Raeder, supra note 37, at 250.
62
See, e.g., Erna Olafson & Cindy S. Lederman, The State of the Debate About
Children’s Disclosure Patterns in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, JUV. & FAM. CT. J. (Winter
2006) at 27, 29 (summarizing literature regarding most adults not disclosing child sexual
abuse as children).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Lindsay C. Malloy et al., Filial Dependency and Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse
Allegations, 46 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 162, 164-65 (2007).
66
Holly Hogan, The False Dichotomy of Rape Trauma Syndrome, 12 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 529, 537 (2006).
67
Jeffrey S. Turner, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS THE LIFESPAN, 92
(1996). Although incest is difficult to assess because it mostly occurs in the privacy of the
abuser’s home, it is estimated that as many as 20 million Americans have been victims of
incest, which is about one in ten persons. Id. In addition, research has also shown that
incestuous families are found in every socioeconomic and educational group. Id.
68
See Malloy et al., supra note 65 at 165.
69
Id. at 166.
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researchers found nothing to indicate that the initial allegations were false.70
Ultimately, adults are just as capable of lying as children,71 but children are
subject to higher levels of scrutiny given the perceived credibility issues.72
B. Multidisciplinary Approach to Addressing Child Sexual Abuse
Child Advocacy Centers were created to deal with child distress and fear
of the court system, and to coordinate the disjointed efforts of social
services and the criminal justice system.73 These centers recognize, prevent,
and support child abuse victims by creating a single location for children to
get a variety of services.74 Many states have adopted the multidisciplinary
team approach to investigating and remedying child sexual abuse.75
Multidisciplinary teams provide “a well-coordinated response to child abuse
allegations in a collaborative manner amongst the various team members,
which generally include social workers, prosecutors, police officers, or
mental and medical health professionals.”76 These teams are better prepared
to “discern the truthfulness of allegation, lessen the trauma of repeated

70

Id.
NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM’N, THE EVIDENCE OF CHILDREN AND OTHER
VULNERABLE WITNESSES: A DISCUSSION PAPER 8 (October 1996).
72
Raeder, supra note 37, at 252.
73
NAT’L CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY CTR., History, http://www.nationalcac.org/history/
history.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). See generally Theodore P. Cross et al.,
Evaluating Children’s Advocacy Centers’ Response to Child Sexual Abuse, JUV. JUST.
BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice/Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention,
Rockville, Md.), Aug. 2008, at 1–2, available at http:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/
218530.pdf.
74
Id.
75
See generally Jonathan Scher, Note, Out-of-Court Statements by Victims of Child
Sexual Abuse to Multidisciplinary Teams: A Confrontation Clause Analysis, 47 FAM. CT.
REV. 167–69 (2009) (advocating for child statements made during forensic interviews
with the multidisciplinary teams to be admitted into evidence).
76
Laura E. Ruzzo, The Testimonial Nature of Multidisciplinary Team Interviews in
Massachusetts: Applying Crawford to the Child Declarant, 16 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 227, 229 (2011).
71
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interviewing, and provide mental health services to traumatized children.”77
Congress showed approval of this approach through the Victims of Child
Abuse Act (VCAA), which encouraged use of multidisciplinary teams to
train judges, attorneys, court officers, and others involved in the prosecution
of child sexual abuse cases.78

III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
ANALYSIS
The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with witnesses against
him.”79 The provision, also known as the Confrontation Clause, provides
criminal defendants with the right to cross-examine an adverse witness, who
must testify under penalty of perjury.80 Thus, out of court statements are
generally inadmissible hearsay.
A. Ohio v. Roberts
From 1980 to 2004, courts used the Roberts standard of reliability test to
determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements.81 In Roberts, the
Court noted that since the Confrontation Clause prefers “face-to-face
confrontation at trial,” the primary interest of the defendant is the right to
cross-examination.82 However, the Court determined that this right is not
absolute; it only limits the scope of admissible hearsay evidence rather than
setting a complete bar.83 So the Court established a new rule for

77

See generally Cross et al., supra note 73.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(g)(2)(G) (2006).
79
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
80
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI (requiring in-court testimony of adverse
witnesses ensures sworn statements).
81
See generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
82
Id. at 63.
83
Id. at 64.
78
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determining admissibility of hearsay evidence: the Roberts test. The
Roberts test requires courts to look at (1) whether the declarant was
available to testify and (2) whether the statement provided adequate “indicia
of reliability” to be trustworthy.84 Indicia of reliability meant that the
evidence either fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or
demonstrates “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”85
For 24 years, the Roberts standard was used in courts across the nation.
However, the Crawford decision in 2004 significantly changed the
framework for hearsay admissibility. Starting with Crawford, the United
States Supreme Court issued a series of opinions that shifted the focus of
the hearsay admissibility test from reliability to the statement’s
“testimonial” nature.86
B. Crawford v. Washington
With Justice Scalia writing for the seven-justice majority, the Crawford
Court overruled Roberts, claiming that the Roberts terms and factors were
too ambiguous.87 After analyzing the history of the Confrontation Clause,
Justice Scalia determined that, first, the Clause was directed at “the use of
ex parte examinations as evidence” in criminal prosecutions against the
accused, and second, the Framers were specifically worried about
testimonial statements of unavailable witnesses that the defendant did not

84

Id. at 66.
Id.
86
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143
(2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
87
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 (stating that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if not entirely
subjective, concept. There are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is
reliable; the nine-factor balancing test applied by the Court of Appeals below is
representative”). Scalia went on further to state that “[w]hether a statement is deemed
reliable depends heavily in which factors the judge consider and how much weight he
accords each of them,” and that the test was “so unpredictable that it fails to provide
meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations.” Id.
85
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have a chance to cross-examine.88 Therefore, Scalia reasoned, the Framers
did not intend to focus on the reliability of the statements, but rather the
testimonial quality of statements.89
Although the Court declined to give a precise test defining what is or is
not “testimonial,” it did provide three examples of potentially testimonial
evidence.90 First, testimonial evidence may be “ex parte in-court testimony
or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorily.”91 Second, testimonial statements could
include “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confession.”92
Third, the evidence could be “statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” also known as
the objective witness test.93 The Court suggested that a “common nucleus”
existed among the three examples but declined to explain this concept
further.94 The Court also failed to define “interrogation” for purposes of this
inquiry, stating only that the term be understood in its “colloquial, rather
than any technical legal, sense.”95
Despite the majority’s intent to provide a clear formula for Confrontation
Clause analysis, the Crawford test has been subject to much criticism—
namely, that it causes “additional confusion, continued judicial activism,

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 50, 53–54.
See id.
See id. at 51–52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53 n.4.
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and further opportunity for interjurisdictional conflict.”96 Without guiding
principles for distinguishing testimonial statements from non-testimonial
statements, the Supreme Court failed to fully correct the structural errors it
saw in Roberts.97 This failure has resulted in confusion and inconsistent
judgments in lower courts across the nation.98 By leaving the definition of
testimonial “for another day,”99 a day which has yet to come, the Court
failed to address a significant gap in Confrontation Clause analysis. The
Court even acknowledged in a footnote “that our refusal to articulate a
comprehensive definition in this case will cause interim uncertainty.”100
This interim period has now lasted a decade, and there has been no rule
repairing the inadequacies of the Crawford test.
C. Evolving Crawford Doctrine
Two years after the decision in Crawford, in the consolidated cases of
Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, the Court addressed the
issues of whether victims’ statements to a 911 operator or in a domestic
violence affidavit were testimonial.101 However, with Justice Scalia again
writing for the majority opinion, the Davis court also failed to clearly define
what makes a statement testimonial. The Court agreed with Crawford’s
assertion that “‘[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of
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E.g. Andrew W. Eichner, Preserving Innocence: Protecting Child Victims in the PostCrawford Legal System 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 101, 104 (2010).
97
Id.; Stephanie McMahon, Note, The Turbulent Aftermath of Crawford v. Washington:
Where for Child Abuse Victims’ Statements Stand?, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 361, 365
(2006).
98
See generally Robert O. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to
Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 921 (2007)
(analyzing similar results but different reasoning in lower court decisions).
99
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
100
Id. at 68 n.10.
101
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).

VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 3 • 2014

1100

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

interrogations,’” are typically testimonial.102 However, the Court also
recognized that in Crawford, it failed to define “interrogation” for purposes
of this inquiry, stating only that the term be understood in its “colloquial,
rather than any technical legal, sense.”103 Forced to more precisely
determine what types of statements in police interrogations are considered
testimonial, the Court found that when police questioning takes place during
an emergency situation, witness statements might be considered nontestimonial.104 Specifically, if the objective primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to address an ongoing
emergency, rather than establish or prove past events relevant to future
prosecution, then the statements are non-testimonial.105
The Court laid out factors to determine if an emergency is present:
whether a reasonable person in the listener’s position would understand that
the declarant’s statements were a call for help during a genuine emergency,
whether the statements were necessary to allow law enforcement to respond
to the existing emergency, and the degree of formality of the questioning.106
Although the Davis opinion attempted to clarify issues left unresolved by
Crawford, it ultimately “attenuated the force of its holding by drawing an
extremely hazy line between what is considered testimonial versus nontestimonial interrogation . . . while simultaneously failing to offer clear
guidance” to determine when a statement shifts from one category to the
next.107
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Id. at 822.
Id. at 53 n.4.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Davis, 547 U.S. at 826–27.
107
Eichner, supra note 96, at 107.
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Three years later, in Michigan v. Bryant, the Court revisited the ongoing
emergency test it had set forward in Davis.108 The Court declared that Davis
was intended to apply only in important situations bearing on the
Confrontation Clause, not necessarily in every case. Specifically, the Court
focused on out-of-court statements where government actors formally
interrogate a declarant to obtain evidence for future prosecution.109 In
Bryant, the Court also enumerated considerations to objectively analyze the
primary purpose test.110 First, lower courts should look at “the
circumstances of an encounter” as well as “the statements and actions of the
parties.”111 Second, courts should deduce the reasonably objective purpose
that these actions and statements imply.112 Curiously, the Court added that
the primary purpose test involves consideration of hearsay rules in
determining reliability of the statement.113
Ultimately, the Crawford line of cases fail to comprehensively define
“testimonial,” which has led to confusion throughout the courts and created
the existing problem in relevant Washington case law.

IV. WASHINGTON FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING CRAWFORD
Washington courts have grappled with the ambiguity resulting from
Crawford and its progeny. In child sexual abuse cases, local appellate courts
have not reached a consensus on the Crawford admissibility of victims’ outof-court statements.114 However, the Crawford decision has severely

108

Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
Id. at 1155.
110
Id. at 1156.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 1155.
114
These cases span from 2004, when Crawford was decided to 2012, when this article
was written. The Washington State Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
determined that Crawford is not retroactive. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007);
109
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limited, if not entirely banned, the admission of child hearsay statements
elicited during forensic interviews and other child sexual abuse out-of-court
statements.115 These types of cases face the greatest challenges116 under
Crawford because difficult child sexual abuse cases often lack physical
evidence or eyewitness testimony. These cases often involve a childdeclarant who is not available for cross-examination and does not appear in
court.117 Such cases are even further complicated by Crawford issues
because of the type of proceeding addressing the abuse, such as civil
commitment hearings where defendants do not have Confrontation Clause
rights.118 Initially, Washington courts analyzed the state of mind of the
declarant to determine the testimonial nature of the statement.119 This was
based on language from Crawford which claimed that statements were

In re Markel, 111 P.3d 249 (Wash. 2005). However, the Ninth Circuit observed the
retroactivity of Crawford until the Whorton ruling. Bockting v. Bayer, 66 F.3d 1010 (9th
Cir. 2005).
115
See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 37, at 375.
116
Sherrie Bourg Carter & Bruce M. Lyons, Crawford and Child Abuse, Domestic
Violence, and Elder Abuse Cases, 6 No. 5 CRIM. PRAC. GUIDE 3 (Sep/Oct 2005).
117
A child’s inability to remember facts while testifying does not implicate Crawford
because the child is still available for cross-examination. State v. Price, 146 P.3d 1183,
1192 (Wash. 2006); State v. Robinson, 166 Wash. App. 1013 (2012); State v. Yackley,
127 Wash. App. 1017 (2005); State v. Price, 110 P.3d 1171 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); State
v. Lobos, 165 Wash. App. 1002 (2011). The child is also available for cross-examination
if he or she forgets the events of the crime or past disclosures while testifying. State v.
Dodgen, 198 P.3d 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). Closed circuit television testimony by the
child-declarant is sufficiently “available for cross examination” under Crawford. State v.
M.G.H., 162 Wash. App. 1020 (2011).
118
Crawford does not apply retroactively, because “[c]riminal defendant[s] who were
denied Crawford’s procedural requirements by reason of timing were not dispossessed of
all meaningful opportunity to challenge the admission of the testimony.” In re Markel,
111 P.3d 249 (Wash. 2005). There are no Sixth Amendment Crawford rights in a
sexually violent predator (SVP) civil commitment hearing. In re Detention of Allen, 174
P.3d 103 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). There are also no Sixth Amendment Crawford rights in
a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SOSSA) revocation hearing. State v.
Marshall, 133 Wash. App. 1021 (2006).
119
E.g. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
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testimonial if the declarant “would reasonably expect [his or her statement]
to be used prosecutorily,” (the objective witness test.)120
The Washington State Supreme Court held in Shafer and Beadle that the
admissibility of all out-of-court statements is determined by a four-factor
test: (1) timing of statement relative to the event, (2) threat of harm, (3)
need of information to resolve a present emergency, and (4) formality of
interrogation. Although the four factors were not exhaustive and these
opinions instructed lower courts to look to other factors,121 typically courts,
including the Washington State Supreme Court, focus solely on these
factors when making determinations of admissibility.122
In Shafer, the morning after the child’s aunt had babysat her, the child
told her mother that her uncle had “touched [her] privates.”123 The court
ultimately held that the child victim’s statements to her mother, and to a
family friend a week later, were non-testimonial.124 This finding was made
despite the fact that the statement to the family friend was made after the
child and her mother had visited the hospital, and the crime had been
reported to the authorities.125 The court also considered the constitutionality
issue of the child hearsay statute, RCW 9A.44.120, and if it conflicted with
Washington State’s Constitution article I, section 22 Confrontation
Clause.126 On that issue, the court determined that the statute had already
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Id. (laying out the objective witness test).
State v. Ohlson, 168 P.3d 1273, 1282–83 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).
122
See State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863 (Wash. 2011) (where the court did not look to
factors outside of the Ohlson four-factor test); see State v. Reed, 278 P.3d 203, 210
(Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (“[o]ur inquiry is guided by [only] four factors”).
123
Shafer, 128 P.3d at 89.
124
Id. at 93.
125
Id. at 89.
126
Id.
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been deemed constitutional in a previous case.127 Rejecting the objective
witness test, the Shafer court found that the three-year-old victim could not
have possibly expected her statements would be used as evidence at trial.128
In Beadle (the facts having been laid out in Part I), the court applied only
the four factors enumerated in Ohlson.129 Ultimately, the court held that the
child’s statements to her mother, her mother’s live-in boyfriend, her
mother’s husband, and her therapist were non-testimonial, while statements
to a detective and a Child Protective Services official were testimonial.130
However, the court stated, “[a]lthough Jensen [the CPS Worker] was not a
law enforcement officer, she was present only to assist the police
departmentnot to protect [the child’s] welfare in her capacity as a CPS
employee.”131 The court implied that had the CPS official not been
questioning the child in assistance of the detective, those statements made
to the official may have been non-testimonial.

127

Id.; State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 202 (1984).
RCW 9A.44.120 comport[s] with the general approach utilized to
test hearsay against confrontation guarantees. The statute requires a
preliminary determination ‘that the time, content, and circumstances
of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.’ It requires
the child to testify at the proceedings, or to be unavailable, and does
not alter the necessary showing of unavailability. Neither
unavailability nor reliability was shown prior to admitting the
hearsay testimony.

Id.
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Id.
State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863 (Wash. 2011).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 870.
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V. WASHINGTON’S APPLICATION OF CRAWFORD
A. Statements to Police Officers and Prosecutors
In Washington, statements to police officers and prosecutors are
generally considered testimonial, but there are some exceptions.132
Washington recognizes the ongoing emergency exception133 as well as an
exception when police involvement is more informal.134 The ongoing
emergency exception is a public policy consideration that such statements
are necessary, but the current Washington analysis of statements to police
officers and prosecutors critically limits the use of this doctrine in child
sexual abuse cases.
1. Ongoing Emergency as Applied to Police and Prosecution
Generally, the ongoing emergency exception in Washington requires that
certain factors be met. In State v. Koslowski, which involved a robbery, the
Washington Supreme Court set out several factors to distinguish between
police officers serving in an emergency capacity and police officers serving
in an investigatory capacity: (1) whether events discussed were occurring at
the time of the statement or shortly thereafter, (2) whether a reasonable
listener would believe there was an ongoing emergency, (3) whether the
purpose of the conversation objectively indicated, and (4) whether the
interrogation was formal.135 Although Crawford generally sought to exclude
statements made to police officers, there has been no per se bar to admitting
these statements.

132

See, e.g., id. See also State v. Price, 110 P.3d 1171 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 146
P.3d 1183 (2006) (holding that a child victim’s statements to a detective were
testimonial, but holding that the defendant had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine
at trial to satisfy Crawford).
133
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826-27 (2006).
134
See Ohlson, 168 P.3d 1273 (Wash. 2007).
135
State v. Koslowski, 209 P.3d 479, 484 (Wash. 2009).

VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 3 • 2014

1106

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

There are also situations where police response is deemed an ongoing
emergency because of the proximity in time between the alleged crime and
the officer’s response. For instance, in State v. Ohlson, statements made by
a minor to a law enforcement officer during the investigation of an assault
were considered non-testimonial.136 In that case, the defendant tried to run
over two juveniles on the side of the road.137 When the officer arrived on
the scene minutes later, one of the minors told him what happened and how
she had to jump out of the way.138 The court found that the purpose of the
questioning was part of the ongoing emergency because the officer was on
the scene within minutes of the alleged assault.139
However, these factors do not consider the special nature of these types
of cases. First, police officers and prosecutors are key members of many
multidisciplinary teams. As previously stated, incest and child sexual abuse
cases frequently require the intervention from law enforcement and
subsequent prosecution in order to end the cycle of violence. Many experts
in the field of child sexual abuse cases would quickly and easily categorize
these types of situations as ongoing emergencies, especially when the
abuser lives in the same home as the victim.140 However, the courts have yet
to recognize this type of situation as an ongoing emergency because the
child is not actively being assaulted when law enforcement intervenes.
Police officers and prosecutors wield the ability to remove these abusers
from the home, allowing the victim to escape ongoing abuse.141
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Id.
Id. at 1275.
138
Id.
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Ohlson, 168 P.3d 1273.
140
See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of
Female Children after Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251 (2001).
141
Abusive Relationships, PLEA.ORG, http://www.plea.org/legal_resources/?a=231&
searchTxt (last update Nov. 4, 2013).
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Additionally, the four factors announced in Koslowski ignore the nature
of child sexual abuse and isolate these cases from other crimes. The first
factor ignores the fact that it is rare for a child to immediately report abuse
as it happens or even minutes later.142 The second factor (whether a
reasonable listener would believe that there was an ongoing emergency) is
equally disserving because detecting child sexual abuse requires special
expertise and training that a reasonable listener may not have. The third
factor ignores the fact that child interview specialists, who are sometimes
also law enforcement, interview the child for the purpose of prosecuting the
abuser.143 Lastly, while the nature of child questioning by law enforcement
and prosecution requires the questioning to be simplified, bringing a child
to a prosecutor’s office and asking them about every detail of the abuse will
likely be interpreted as formal interrogation. Therefore, these factors are not
helpful in child sexual abuse cases because a large number of these cases
are excluded just based on their nature as child victim cases.
2. Police and Prosecution in Informal Contexts
Distinguishing between casual and formal police interactions is what
Crawford intends to do and, theoretically, such an analysis will produce
good results. However, the applied factors fail to recognize this difference.
First, Crawford and its progeny exclude information based on how closely
the statement resembles in-court testimony. This requires a case-by-case
analysis. However, as explained above, the four-factor test used in
Washington generally does not favor admission of statements made to law
enforcement. Therefore, it seems like most cases involving informal

142

See, e.g., id.
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SRVS.,
Techniques for the Child Interview and a Methodology for Substantiating Sexual Abuse,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/sexabuse/sexabusee.cfm (last visited
April 7, 2013).
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statements to police could still be inadmissible based on the nature of child
sexual abuse and the investigation. Second, the Davis court expressed the
importance of admissibility of statements to resolve an ongoing
emergency,144 yet Washington courts use factors that narrowly identify
“ongoing” as singular events.145 Because by the time a child reports he or
she is not actively being abused, child sexual abuse is not considered an
ongoing emergency.
3. Police in 911 Calls
When the call is for emergency help, 911 calls are sometimes considered
non-testimonial.146 However, children who experience sexual abuse rarely
call 911.147 A 911 call about child sexual abuse is more likely to be the
result of the child victim telling a confidant who then reports it to law
enforcement. In such a case, hearsay is an issue. Therefore, any hope for
admission of statements by abused children, through a 911 exception, is
highly unlikely. Overall, most out-of-court statements to police or
prosecutors will generally be excluded as violations of the Confrontation
Clause.
B. Statements to Child Welfare and Social Workers
Statements to social workers are usually classified as testimonial because
they are government employees who record and report incriminating
information to law enforcement, which are used primarily for

144

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
See State v. Koslowski, 209 P.3d 479, 484 (Wash. 2009).
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State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005); State v. Pugh, 225 P.3d 892 (Wash. 2009);
State v. Saunders, 132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
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prosecution.148 However, courts have sometimes recognized that the
primary purpose of a social worker interview is “not only to collect
evidence of past events to secure the prosecution of an offender but to
protect prospectively a child in need.”149
In Beadle, a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker, while accompanied
by a police officer, interviewed a three-year-old victim.150 Based on Shafer,
the Court of Appeals found the statements were non-testimonial where a
three-year old child victim was found unable to have possibly expected her
statements to be used in a criminal prosecution.151 However, the
Washington State Supreme Court rejected this concept—that the primary
purpose test should be declarant-centric when police interrogation is
involved, and decided instead to look at the officer’s state of mind.152 The
court ultimately determined that the police officer’s presence tainted the
admissibility of those statements and that the CPS worker was “only present
to assist the police department, not to protect the [child’s] welfare,” in [the
CPS worker’s] professional capacity.153
Although the Washington Supreme Court was unwilling to consider child
welfare as a primary purpose in these investigations, in State v. Hopkins,
Division 2 of the Washington State Court of Appeals did exactly that.154 In
that case, a CPS worker met with the child victim on two occasions.155 The
court found the purpose of the first meeting was a safety check to assess and
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Stephanie McMahon, The Turbulent Aftermath of Crawford v. Washington: Where Do
Child Abuse Victims’ Statements Stand?, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 361, 382 (2006).
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State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 788–89 (N.J. 2008).
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State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863 (Wash. 2011).
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Id.
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Id. at 870.
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State v. Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
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Id. at 257.
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ensure the child was safe and secure where she was living.156 The court
reasoned that the worker used innocuous, non-leading questions and the
child spontaneously reported information about her abuser.157
However, the court stated that, although the second meeting could be
characterized as an attempt to protect the child, the information gathered
was also meant for subsequent prosecution.158 The social worker testified
that her role in the second meeting was to investigate; she recorded
information gained in the interview and asked questions based on the
disclosures.159 She also testified that the explicit purpose of documenting
the visit was because the victim was disclosing information about a
crime.160
Ultimately, the court believed that the CPS worker’s child welfare role
overlapped with her investigatory law enforcement role, thus her role
produced incriminating statements elicited outside the course of an ongoing
emergency.161 The court focused its analysis on the primary purpose of the
investigation from the listener’s point of view.162 By recognizing the dualpurpose of social workers in such cases, the court balanced the
constitutional rights of the defendant against those interests of the victim
and the search for justice. This balance is particularly just because it
recognizes the multifaceted role of the CPS worker, or anyone acting as a
confidant of a child who has been the victim of sexual abuse. The
investigatory role of CPS workers protects the defendant’s rights, while the
welfare role reflects the victim’s interests.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Unfortunately, the holding in Beadle supersedes Hopkins. Despite the
judicial system’s general adversity to looking into the mind of police
officers,163 and despite the Davis court requiring a declarant-centric primary
purpose,164 the Beadle court reasoned that, as long as a CPS worker is aware
of an ongoing criminal investigation, the primary purpose of his or her
questioning is for subsequent prosecution.165 This holding forecloses the
possibility of CPS conducting investigations in many child sexual abuse
cases where law enforcement or government action is necessary to remove
the child from danger because courts will characterize CPS action as
criminal investigation.
C. Statements to Medical Personnel and Other Hospital Employees
Statements made by children to medical personnel are typically perceived
as non-testimonial166 because the purpose of the conversation is to ascertain
the child’s medical history, to diagnose, and to treat.167 In State v. Borboa,
the child victim was brought to a hospital where she disclosed sexual abuse
by her father.168 Because neither the child nor the family spoke English, a
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See, e.g., Holyfield v. State, 711 P.2d 834, 838 n.4 (Nev. 1985).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006).
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See State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863, 870 (2011).
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See generally Dave Gordon, Is There an Accuser in the House?: Evaluating
Statements Made to Physicians and Other Medical Personnel in the Wake of Crawford v.
Washington and Davis v. Washington, 38 N.M. L. REV. 529 (2008).
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State v. Sandoval, 154 P.3d 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a domestic
violence victim’s description of the incident to an emergency room physician was
admissible, despite inclusion of statements identifying the perpetrator); State v. Saunders,
132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a domestic violence victim’s
statements to a paramedic and to an emergency room physician were non-testimonial,
despite the victim’s identification of the assailant); State v. Moses, 119 P.3d 906 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2005) (victim’s statements to medical personnel in a murder case were found to
be non-testimonial); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (victim’s
statements to medical personnel in a case for assault on a child were non-testimonial.
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State v. Borboa, 135 P.3d 469, 471 (Wash. 2006).
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hospital interpreter was present at the physical examination.169 Although the
Washington Supreme Court did not decide whether the statements were
testimonial, because the issue was not briefed on appeal and defense
conceded the issue at oral arguments, it signaled its assent to the lower
court’s holding.170 A finding that the statements were not testimonial is
supported by the fact that the hospital interpreter was present to relay
medically relevant information to the doctors and assist the medical team,
not to assist law enforcement or other government actors.171
In State v. Anderson, Division 2 of the Washington Court of Appeals
addressed whether statements to a nurse during a sexual assault exam were
testimonial or non-testimonial.172 In that case, the prosecution alleged that
the defendant had lured a little boy into a public restroom, persuaded him to
lie down on his back, and then got on top of him to engage in sexual
conduct.173 Because the State wanted to introduce molestation evidence of a
different minor who was unavailable to testify, the prosecutor sought to call
a nurse who had had a conversation with the minor.174 The minor had come
to the nurse following a forensic interview with a detective who told the
nurse what the child had already disclosed.175 The court determined that the
examination was part of a “team approach” to investigations, referring to
the multidisciplinary teams used frequently in child sexual abuse cases.176
Additionally, the court concluded, but did not find dispositive, that the
nurse had received information from a detective to whom the child had
disclosed information to prior to the exam; thus, her conversation with the
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Id. at 475, n.3.
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Id. at 471.
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State v. Anderson, 153 Wash. App. 1026, *1 (2009).
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child could be considered part of the investigation.177 However, the court
believed that the statements to the nurse were elicited in the course of
obtaining medical history to treat and diagnose the child, not to investigate
on the detective’s behalf.178 The factual finding that the nurse never used
leading questions supported this holding.179
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed the ruling because
the nurse had knowledge that the child had already disclosed information to
law enforcement.180 The court did not look at whether the child believed the
statements would later be used for future prosecution.181 This suddenly
shifted the analysis from looking at the declarant-based primary purpose
test to a Davis listener-based test.
The Court of Appeals Division 2 signaled agreement with the State’s
argument in State v. Earl, but ultimately decided the issue based on
harmless error.182 In that case, the victims’ abuser was the father, who had
impregnated one of the child victims.183 While at a prenatal appointment,
the pregnant child made statements to a nurse who later testified at trial.184
The court acknowledged that the State’s argument to the appeals court was
likely correct, that the statements were non-testimonial because they were
made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, not elicited for
subsequent prosecution.185
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Id.
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Id.
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Anderson, 254 P.3d 818 (holding that the statements were admissible anyways under a
harmless error analysis).
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See id. at 817.
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Lastly, the Division 2 Court in State v. Hopkins addressed the out-ofcourt statements made to a nurse,186 but applied a completely different
standard of analysis.187 Although the nurse’s statements were introduced
through the nurse’s report in this case, the substantive analysis of the
primary purpose test should be the same as if the nurse had testified; the
only difference is the additional level of hearsay presented by the report. 188
Instead of looking at the primary purpose of the nurse from the declarant’s
point of view, the court used an objective witness test.189 The court held that
an objective witness would believe the report would be used for later
prosecution.190 The court reasoned that the nurse knew there was an
ongoing investigation and that the nurse manifested this knowledge and
intent by forwarding the report to a deputy officer.191
These cases reveal inconsistencies in reasoning and holdings within
Court of Appeals Division 2 level and at the Supreme Court level. For
example, although the Washington Supreme Court in Shafer stated that
objective witness tests should not be used, only six months later, the
Division 2 Hopkins court proceeded under this objective-witness
analysis.192 Division 2 subsequently decided multiple cases without
overruling use of the objective witness test, or overruling the Hopkins
court’s dismissal of statements to nurses if they are aware of criminal
investigation. The prior cases are still good law; therefore, there is a lack of
clarity that will continue to create confusion in the trial courts and appellate
divisions..
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State v. Hopkins, 142 P.3d 1104, 1105 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 790–91.
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By shifting between objective-witness tests, declarant-centric tests, and
listener-centric tests, appellate courts have confused the proper inquiry for
these types of cases. When courts found these statements to be nontestimonial, it was because they confused the primary purpose with the
secondary purpose. For example, although the nurse in Hopkins likely
intended to eventually give the report to law enforcement, her primary
purpose as a nurse was medical, and any collateral effect on an investigation
was secondary. Furthermore, through application of the declarant-centric
test prescribed by Davis, the child would reasonably view the nurse’s
primary purpose was for her own health and well-being.
D. Statements to Family Members and Friends
Courts usually hold statements made to family and close friends as nontestimonial.193 The circumstances surrounding these statements usually
reflect the close personal relationship between the child-declarant and the
listener.194 These are the types of casual statements the original Crawford
court believed to be non-testimonial because the personal nature of the
statements shows the unlikelihood they were intended for use in later
prosecution.195 This is also the standard in Washington cases of child sexual
abuse.196
The issue in Shafer revolved around statements made to a family friend
who had been a confidential informant for several law enforcement
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See State v. Beadle, 154 Wash. App. 1021, *7 (2010); State v. Borboa, 135 P.3d 469,
471 (Wash. 2006), Shafer, 128 P.3d 87; State v. Walker, 118 P.3d 935 (Wash. Ct. App.
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VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 3 • 2014

1116

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

agencies, including the CIA and the FBI.197 The court held that the
statement was non-testimonial partly based on the close proximity in time
between the abuse and when the child made the statements to the family
friend.198 The court refused to conclude the statements were testimonial
even though it acknowledged the ethical and legal implications of this case;
simply put, the statements were elicited by a confidential informant using
learned questioning techniques, with the full intent to use them in a future
criminal investigation.199 Instead, the court decided that the informant was
not acting on behalf of any law enforcement agency at the time of the
questioning and the child had no reason to expect that her statements would
later be used for prosecution.200 The court was uneasy about statements
which the informant videotaped, however, and excluded that evidence.201
This case demonstrates the problems of a mixed-test analysis. Although
the child may not have realized the testimonial nature of such structured and
formal questioning, the court cannot disregard that this questioning is very
similar to police interrogation. Friends of children whose parents are police
can now circumvent the Confrontation Clause limits on the admissibility of
out-of-court statements. Although this is good news for child victims and
the prosecution, this particular case only further complicates what should be
clear rules.
E. Statements in Business Records
Business documents are usually non-testimonial because they are
prepared for public records or business purposes rather than for evidence in
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a criminal case.202 However, one appellate court found an exception in a
child sexual abuse case and held business documents to be testimonial.203
One exception was noted when a nurse submitted a report to an
investigating deputy and the nurse knew there was an ongoing
investigation.204
Several cases demonstrate how documents submitted by out-of-court
declarants are non-testimonial in the context of child sexual abuse cases. In
State v. Graciano, the Division 2 Court of Appeals found Department of
Licensing certification was non-testimonial.205 The court did not explain
much of its reasoning, but rather cited to State v. Mares. The Mares court
reasoned that business and public records are generally non-testimonial
because they are created for administration of an entity’s affairs and not for

202

See, e.g., State v. Benefiel, 128 P.3d 1251 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
certified copies of the defendant’s underlying conviction and sentence were nontestimonial). The court claimed that these documents were typical public records and
were not statements written for the purpose of subsequent prosecution, rejecting the
defendant’s argument that the State had a duty to prosecute the clerk who certified the
copies of the judgment and sentence so that the defendant could cross-examine the clerk.
Id. See also State v. Fleming, 228 P.3d 804 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that business
records showing the value of a property in a theft case were non-testimonial because the
records were prepared for business purposes long before the alleged theft took place);
State v. Bellerouche, 120 P.3d 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that business records
are never testimonial, and that a “no trespass” notice is a business record in a trespassing
prosecution).
203
See State v. Hopkins, 134 Wash. App. 1034 (2006) (holding that a report written by a
nurse concerning the child victim’s statements and physical condition was testimonial
because the report was prepared at the request of law enforcement and the nurse was not
available for cross-examination). Business records are usually defined narrowly to
include only objective, nearly clerical, information and to not always include reports of
opinion. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.M., 125 P.3d 245 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding
that written expert reports of persons who were not present in court were testimonial
because they reflected professional judgment and expertise and not the sort of “routine
clerical notations” that are admissible).
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See Hopkins, 134 Wash. App. 1034.
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State v. Graciano, 163 Wash. App. 1014, *4 (2011).
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the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial.206 Specifically, the
business records in both cases only attested to the authenticity of a public
record and offered no interpretation of the record or assertions of “its
relevance, substance, or effect.”207
Similar in character to cases involving business records, State v. Earl
found that a blood-draw form was non-testimonial.208 The victims in that
case were two sisters who had been raped by their father.209 A Child
Protective Services worker asked both children to get blood tests and drove
them to an appropriate facility with their mother.210 The Division 2 court
determined that the blood-draw form was a business record.211 The court
also found the form non-testimonial on the basis that it was not an
accusatory statement, but rather only stated when the blood draw occurred
and whose blood it was.212 The court supported this holding by citing the
corroboration by other evidence and testimony.213
Similarly, a Division 3 case decided that a letter from the attorney of the
defendant’s brother to the victim’s mother was non-testimonial.214 In
Merrick, the mother was a widow and had remarried her late husband’s
brother, the defendant.215 After the defendant was accused and tried for
first-degree rape of a child, the prosecution sought to admit the letter
because it raised concerns about the defendant contacting the victim.216
Ultimately, the court held that the purpose of the letter was not for later
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prosecution, but to express concerns to the victim’s mother.217 Additionally,
the letter was not written by a government officer.218
Only one child sexual abuse case found documentation to be testimonial
in nature—Hopkins.219 In that case, the nurse did not testify but the
prosecution sought to admit her report. There the court employed the
objective-witness analysis rather than the business record exception.220
F. Statements to Therapists and Counselors
Statements made to therapists and counselors may or may not be
testimonial based on a variety of circumstances.221 Such statements are
more of a hybrid between multiple categories. These types of statements
may also fall under medical personnel or prosecutorial categories,
depending on the employment of the therapist. As the following case
implies, courts could deal with statements to therapists in a number of ways.
The Beadle court did not have the opportunity to directly address whether
the child’s statements to a mental health clinician and to a therapist were
testimonial because the issue was not raised on appeal.222 However, the
court implicitly seemed to agree with a non-testimonial characterization,
citing the mother’s role in getting both professionals involved in order to
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begin the mental healing process for her daughter.223 Furthermore, the
disclosure to the therapist was completely unprompted, and the girl by her
own volition showedthe therapist on a doll where her assailant touched
her.224

VI. PROBLEMS WITH WASHINGTON’S CURRENT APPLICATION
Even though a child’s statements of sexual abuse are unlikely to fall
within the three categories of testimonial statements enumerated in
Crawford, a court will likely categorize the statements as testimonial
because of the nature of these cases. Under Crawford, testimonial
statements are : (1) ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent,
(2) extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials,
and (3) statements where an objective witness would reasonably believe the
statement would be used in court. Because trauma from child sexual abuse
is ongoing and pervasive,225 children who are unavailable to testify at trial
due to said trauma were also likely unavailable before trial to give a proper
affidavit, deposition, or sworn testimony. Like the victim in Beadle,
children can be psychologically traumatized by the time a criminal
investigation begins. Thus, these statements are unlikely to fit within the
three Crawford categories.
However, due to this trauma, children are likely to receive substantial
assistance (whether by therapists, doctors, or law enforcement) during the
criminal investigation process or at a child advocacy center. Therefore,
many of the statements a child makes in that time will be categorized as
testimonial’.
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Id. at 866.
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Washington state cases also contradict one another, and internal
contradictions exist within cases as well. For example, in both Beadle and
Shafer, the court drew a distinction between law enforcement officers acting
in their official capacities and family friends not acting in their official
capacities.226 This difference in results is inconsistent with the Beadle
court’s holding that the Shafer test does not apply to law enforcement, albeit
without overruling Shafer, because the court did in fact apply the test to this
family friend who was a law enforcement official. The two factual cases are
substantially the same, except for that the law enforcement in Shafer had a
prior relationship to the child. However, this family friend took a recorded
statement,227 used interrogation techniques and methods learned from law
enforcement training,228 and prompted the child with questions long after
becoming informed about the abuse,229 rather than an “in the moment”
inquiry like the mother in Beadle.230 Additionally, Beadle argued that the
presence of a CPS official while the police questioned the child was still
testimonial.231 However, the Beadle opinion implies that if police had not
been present and the CPS official was operating in her capacity as a
guardian of the child’s welfare, the statement would have been nontestimonial.232
Generally, if the child’s guardian is willing to waive privilege and bring
the counselor into court, these statements will be non-testimonial.233
However, because child victims often seek counseling after the initiation of
the prosecutorial process, it is possible, if not likely, that a court would be
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hostile to these statements’ admissibility on the principle that the counselor
and the guardian are aware of the pending trial. This issue has not been fully
argued before the Washington appellate courts yet.
If such an issue were to arise, the courts should look to the overall intent
of the conversation. Unlike in Beadle, there would not be the presence of a
law enforcement officer, nor would a law enforcement officer request the
counseling similar to Hopkins. Rather, a therapist’s testimony would fall
squarely in line with the facts of Shafer and the court would have to
consider whether the child reasonably believed her statements in therapy
would be used for prosecution. Moreover, even under a listener-centric
regime, the therapist or counselor is occupationally driven to address the
pain and trauma of the child, not to investigate and prosecute criminals.
Simply being in contact with police or fulfilling mandatory reporting
obligations should not wholly preclude this type of testimony as nontestimonial.

VII. PROPOSED CHANGES
Because of the inconsistencies in both holding and reasoning among
Washington courts, it is clear that either the state legislature or the state
supreme court must provide clarity. Crawford is heavily criticized in the
legal community, and there are several proposals to fix the problems it has
caused.234 Attorney Andrew Eichner discusses the possibility of placing a
large screen between the child victim and the defendant when the child
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rights).
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takes the stand.235 Alternatively, many states, including Washington,236 have
enacted processes to allow testimony through closed-circuit, one-way
televisions after this procedure was allowed in Maryland v. Craig.237
Eichner argues that the Crawford interpretation of admissible statements is
far too narrow and needs to be broadened to even the balance between
victims and defendants.238
Another consideration is the rebuttable presumption test. Judge
Advocate Major Rebecca K. Connally proposed that courts use a rebuttable
presumption because it establishes a rule and creates avenues for exceptions
to the rule.239 After the prosecution establishes the presumption that a
statement is non-testimonial, the burden would shift to the defendant to
prove the statement is testimonial.240
Although the reliability of a statement is no longer the test of its
admissibility, courts should make a preliminary inquiry as to whether the
child-declarant is capable of making a testimonial statement.241 Specifically,
the age of a child along with the circumstances of disclosure may render the
child unable to “bear witness” in the formal sense that Crawford sought to
exclude.
Overall, a totality of the circumstances approach is the most just and
equitable method for balancing the defendant’s rights and the interests of
justice. By using a totality of the circumstances test, courts could take
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information about the nature of child sexual abuse and how it is often
underreported into consideration, while still upholding the principles of
Crawford.
For example, if the substance of the statement was minimally accusatory
or innocuous, a court could allow its admission under Crawford. Other
jurisdictions have looked to the nature and substance of the child’s
statement in determining its testimonial quality. Some courts have analyzed
the degree of the statement’s accusatory nature, meaning statements that
directly incriminate the defendant are subject to a higher level of
confrontation scrutiny.242 Another relevant inquiry would be whether the
statement falls under a hearsay exception, such as excited utterance, that
diminishes the possibility of fabrication.243 This allows a court to determine
whether the statement also falls under a hearsay exception under an
evidentiary analysis as well as under a Confrontation Clause analysis.
One court already used this totality of circumstances approach. Although
the Alaska Court of Appeals has not directly addressed how the
Confrontation Clause should be applied in sexual abuse cases, the court has
used an “entirety of the circumstances” analysis.244 In contrast to
Washington, this totality of the circumstances analysis allows Alaska courts
to categorize statements made to social workers, like CPS workers, to be
non-testimonial.245 John J. Gochnour proposed that the Alaska legislature
codify these general rules into Alaska law in order to increase consistency
and fairness of prosecutions, facilitate compliance with the Confrontation
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Clause, and recognize the reliability and necessity of child hearsay
testimony in child sexual abuse cases.246
Similarly, adoption of a totality of the circumstances approach would
help facilitate more fair and just results in Washington courts, which have
used a variety of frameworks as compared to the unified framework used in
Alaska courts. This action could be taken either by the Washington
legislature or judiciary. Such legislation could take into account all of the
factors and realities of child sexual abuse so when judges evaluate the
admissibility of such statements, they are less inclined to be wedded to the
four factors currently in force.
Courts employing a totality of the circumstances approach would need to
consider factors such as: the status and role of the listener (including what
capacity that person was acting in at the time); the listener’s relationship to
the child; the behavior of the child during the interaction; the substance of
the statement (different parts maybe testimonial or non-testimonial); and the
environment in which the statement was made.
This list of factors is not exhaustive and shows the variety of
circumstances and nuances that can be present in any child sexual abuse
case. Given the gravity of emotional and psychological damage caused to
all parties in child abuse cases, these cases are examples of how a specific
crime needs to be considered in a Crawford analysis to truly understand the
mental state of declarants and listeners.
Additionally, government teams that aid in child sexual abuse cases,
including law enforcement, child interview specialists, CPS workers, and
counselors, are better equipped to maintain the accuracy and integrity of an
out-of-court statement. Moreover, defendants have the ability to base their
defense on the validity of the statement itself as well as the procedures and
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circumstances under which the statement was made and observed by these
government actors.
Although the reliability of a statement is no longer the test of its
admissibility, courts should make a preliminary inquiry as to whether the
child-declarant is capable of making a testimonial statement.247 Specifically,
the age of a child along with the circumstances of disclosure may render the
child unable to “bear witness” in the formal sense that Crawford sought to
exclude.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite the confusion and inconsistencies caused by the Crawford
decision, Washington has an opportunity to clarify these issues because the
United States Supreme Court has failed to comprehensively define a test for
determining testimonial statements. Washington should employ a totality of
the circumstances test to clearly and fairly comprehend the complexities of
each case.
Given the inconsistencies in allowing some statements in child sexual
abuse cases in Washington, immediate attention and solutions are
necessary. Ever since the McMartin scandal discussed above and other
controversies about false accusations of children, the law has responded by
refusing to admit otherwise probative evidence in child sexual abuse cases.
By addressing the sociological and psychological complexities in these
cases in the law, courts can better evaluate the case and better serve the
interests of justice and fairness.
Additionally, the Crawford framework in Washington needs to be clear
for practitioners to understand how the system works in order to advocate
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for their clients. There must be a workable, yet fair system for judges to
apply to the facts, thus supplying them with the necessary tools to balance
between the defendant’s constitutional rights and the interests of the
prosecution, the victim, and the community in each specific case. Without
clearing up these issues, litigants will be subject to the ebb and flow of
judicial scrutiny of which framework to apply. It will be extremely difficult
if not impossible for these attorneys to properly argue issues for a judge
whom may take an approach different from what the attorney has
researched. Lastly, this system is necessary for judicial economy and
fairness: providing each case a fresh look at the facts, and then applying the
law. In the current regime, there have been and there will continue to be
misapplication and inconsistent rulings. In the end, the people of
Washington would collectively be better served because a shift in
application of Crawford would allow cases like child sexual abuse to be
fully remedied by the laws that seek to prevent it.
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